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APPELLATE PROCEDURE
PAUL D. BARNS'
PART I
APPE1ALS, CERTIORARI AND LEGISLATIVES PROPOSED REVISED JUDICIARY ARTICLES
Right to Appeal
Prepayment of costs: Jurisdictional. The Circuit Court allowed the
original plaintiff-appellant to pay costs more than a month after an appeal
had been taken from the Civil Court of Record to the Circuit Court. The
question presented was whether Section 59.09 of the Florida Statutes made
the payment of costs, by an original plaintiff, a jurisdictional condition
precedent to the taking of an appeal, when the costs were specifically taxed
in an amount certain and the original plaintiff had not assigned the taxation
of costs as error and superseded their taxation, The court held that the
prepayment of costs was jurisdictional to the right to appeal and quashed
the circuit court judgment.'
Prepayment of costs by appellant-plaintiff: Not jurisdictional. Berg
v. New York Life Insurance Company,2 modified the holding in Walker-
Skagseth,' and held that the prepayment of accrued costs by an appellant-
plaintiff was for the benefit of the defendants and, therefore, was not
jurisdictional.
Only aggrieved party may appeal. In Bessemer Properties v. City of
Opa-Locka,4 a suit for a declaratory decree to test the validity of bonds
was brought by the city-appellee against a prospective purchaser. The pros-
pcctive purchaser prosecuted an appeal from a favorable decree. Since
the appellant was not aggrieved by the decree, the appeal was dismissed.
Credit Industrial Co. v. Re-Mark Chemical Co.5 held that a party may not
appeal from a final decree wholly favorable to him.
Only Final Judgments and Decrees Appealable
Orders denying motions, petitions and applications are interlocutory
and not appealable . Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands,"
involved an appeal from an order of the judge denying the appellant's
application for the issuance of process pursuant to a statute relating to
the enforcement of tax liens. The proceedings sounded in rem. The court
held that neither an appeal nor certiorari would lie and, hence, the case
*Professor, University of Miami School of Law. Justice of Florida Suprene
Court (retired).
1. Hale v. Martin, 76 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1954).
2. 81 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1955).
3. 148 F12. 163, 3 So.2d 756 (1941).
4. 74 So.2d 296 (Fla. 19541.
5. 67 So.2d 540 (Fa. 1953).
6. 80 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1955).
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was dismissed. Appellant might have obtained relief by mandamus. In
Hie v. Lewis, 7 the court held that an order on a petition for a writ of
mandamus which stated "accordingly the prayer of said petition is hereby
denied" was neither reviewable by certiorari, nor, in the absence of words
of dismissal, was it a final judgment from which an appeal would lie.
Wood v. Sinclair Refining Co.8 held that an order that the defendant's
motion to dismiss be and is "granted" was not a final judgment but only an
interlocutory order and, therefore, not appealable.
Entr
, 
of Appeal
Sufficiency of notice. In Seaboard Air Line R.R, v. Holt, the court
held that the notice of appeal was sufficient even though it failed to follow
the "form" suggested by Florida Supreme Court Rule 39. The notice
specified that it was an appeal from the final judgment, but gave an
crorneous date of entry. It is the substance of the notice and not form
that is material.
Certiorari is not an appeal, but an appeal may be treated as petition
for certiorari. A petition for review of a final decree by writ of certiorari
was not treated as an "appeal." Under such circumstances, the court had
no power of review except on duly prosecuted appeal. In the case of
Bartow Growers Processing Corp. v. Florida Growers Processing Coopera-
tive,10 the court held that the motion to dismiss the certiorari proceeding
was well founded and that the order sought to be reviewed was a final
decree reviewable only by appeal. In the case of Dustin v. Latzko," it
was noted that an "order . . . dismissing [a] bill of complaint as to certain
named defendants was a final judgment as to such defendants reviewable
only by appeal . . . ." Similar holdings were reached in Alerman v. Puritan
Dairy,12 and Spivey v. Huss.' Although Section 59.45 of the Florida
Statutes (1951) provided that an appeal improvidently taken could "be
regarded and acted on as a petition for certiorari duly presented," it did
not provide that a petition for certiorari, improvidently filed, could be
treated as an appeal.
Habeas corpus: Time limitation. Section 924.09 of the Florida Statutes,
relating to criminal appeals, allows 90 days for a defendant to appeal from
a judgment or sentence. Section 924.07 (6) of the Florida Statutes makes
a judgment, discharging a prisoner on habeas corpus, appealable by the
state within 20 days as provided by Section 924.10 of the Florida Statutes.
7. 71 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1954).
8. 73 So.2d 226 (Fla. 1954).
9. 80 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1955).
10. 71 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1954).
11. 155 Fla. 824, 21 So2d 904 (1945).
12. 145 Fla. 292, 199 So. 44 (19401.
13. 147 Fla. 527, 3 So.2d 127 (1941).
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In Snell v. Mayo,14 the appeal was taken by petitioner in a habeas
corpus proceeding more than 60 days and less than 90 days after the final
judgment of dismissal. The appellee filed a motion to dismiss upon the
ground that habeas corpus proceedings were civil, not criminal proceedings,
and, as in the case of State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski,1 the 60 day limitation
for taking an appeal had run. The court recognized this, but held that
in that case the petitioner was not held on a charge or conviction of
violating the criminal laws, as in the case at bar, and denied the motion
to dismiss. Habeas corpus actions are usually treated as civil actions.
Calculation of time. Schneider v. Cohan,'8 held that the time for
taking an appeal commenced to run from the day the judgment or decree
was actually recorded by the clerk, and not from the date of order nor
from the date of filing with the clerk.
Calculation of time for appeal when last day a Sunday. In the case
of In re McRae's Estate,7 the thirtieth day (of the 30 days allowed in
Section 732.16 of the Florida Statutes for an appeal from the County
Judge's Court in matters of probate) fell on Sunday and the appeal was
entered on the following Monday. A motion to dismiss because the
appeal was not timely was granted following the rule of a prior decision,
In re Warner's Estate.18 Under the court rules governing appeals from
other courts, the rule is to the contrary.",
Limitation of time: Petition for rehearing does not toll. The court, in
Weisberg v. Perl,2" held that the limitation of time for taking an appeal
from a summary final judgment in a common law action was not tolled by
the filing of a petition for rehearing or for new trial.
Interlocutory Certiorari in Equity
Interlocutory statutory certiorari: Not certiorari but appeal. In Wilson
v. McCoy Mfg. Co.,21 Justice Thomas stated that an interlocutory certiorari
under Supreme Court Rule 34 was not certiorari but an appeal and was
not to be confused with the common law certiorari authorized by the
Constitution. It was stated:
This brings us to a consideration of the nature and scope of the
writ of certiorari as it may be used in examining orders of the com-
mission. At the outset we are moved to say that the writ of
certiorari afforded by the constitution should not be confused
with the so-called certiorari provided by Supreme Court Rule
number 34, 30 F.SA. We make this observation because some
14. 80 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1955).
15. 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207 (1933).
16. 73 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1954).
17. 73 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1954).
18. 160 Fla. 103, 33 So.2d 728,730 (1948).
19. See also Carlile v. Spofford, 65 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1953).
20. 73 Sa.2d 56 (Fla. 1954).
21. 69 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
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attorneys have mixed the two. Certiorari under the rule was de-
signed simply as a streamlined method of bringing appeals
authorized by law to be taken from interlocutory orders entered in
chancery. True, the procedure in both kinds of certioraris, as is
shown by the reference in rule 34 to rule 28, is similar but the
elements differ entirely, one having all the qualities of an appeal,
the other being severely restricted in its operation.
The statutory provisions and court rule governing interlocutory cer-
tiorari are as follows:
Section 59.01(5) Florida Statutes (1953) provides:
All proceedings for review, from a lower Court to the proper
appellate court, shall be by appeal except where certiorari lies, or
where otherwise expressly provided by law.
Section 59.02(3) Florida Statutes (1953) authorizing the above men-
tioned Rule 34, as well as the statute authorizing the new Rule 14 (1)
states:
Interlocutory Orders and Decrees in Equity. Review of inter-
locutory orders and decrees in equity, including those after final
decree, may be by proceedings in the nature of certiorari in the
Supreme Court.
Rule 34(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in
the Wilson case, as well as at the time of the first decision on petition
for certiorari in the Harnel22 case was as follows:
Interlocutory Appeals to be by Certiorari. All appeals from
interlocutory decrees as authorized by statute including orders or
decrees after final decree, shall be prosecuted to this court by
certiorari in the manner provided by the rules relating to the
constitutional writ of certiorari.
Even though the statute and the court rule treat review by an appeal
as distinguishable from certiorari, the decisions have consistently held that
review under Rule 34 is an appeal insofar as the "law of the case" is
involved, and that "certiorari denied" means "decree affirmed. '23
In Haimel v. Danko,24 the appellee moved to strike three of appellant's
assignments of error upon the ground that the court had previously "denied
without opinion" a petition of certiorari filed by Hamel, which petition
presented for review the same three orders.
The appellant, in opposition to appellee's motion, relied upon Section
59.021 Florida Statutes (1953), providing:
Denial of Petition, Effect. The denial of a petition shall have
the force and effect upon the act order, decree or judgment of
which review is sought only to the extent that the court may
22. 82 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1955).
23. See 8 MIAmi L.P. 444 (1954) for a collection of cases on this subject.
24. Ibid.
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affirmatively and expressly act, but the mere denial of such petition
shall have no greater force and effect than to deny the further
exercise of jurisdiction.
The court granted appellee's motion to strike and reaffirmed Hunter
v. Tyner,25 as follows:
We said, in Hunter v. Tyner, supra, in reference to the review
of an interlocutory order in an equity suit, and now reiterate,
'a writ of this kind being simply a method of procedure by
which such appeals authorized by the statute can be brought
to this court, its denial, we think, was an adjudication of the
propriety of the order involved and it could not again be questioned
in this appeal."
In reference to Section 59.021 of the Florida Statutes, the court further
stated:
The above statute, enacted subsequent to our decision in Hunter
v. Tyner, supra, is a clear invasion upon functions exclusively
vested in the judiciary. The legislature has no power to act in
that area. The statute is a manifest and palpable violation on its
face of the separation of powers doctrine which is imbedded in
Article II of our Constitution and which is essential to the
preservation of our American system of government. For that
basic reason it is void, frustrate and of no effect.
The appellee's motion to strike required the court to pass directly on
the question of whether the foregoing statute impaired the exercise of
judicial powers, vested exclusively in the court by the constitution.
If the statute had been construed as declaratory of the law and the
court had construed its previous action of "certiorari denied" as having no
other meaning, then of course the act would not have in any way impaired
the exercise of judicial power. Such a holding would have been supported
by the court's previous holdings to the effect that "the law of the case is
fixed by issues actually adjudicated on appeal and does not extend to such
issues as might have properly been adjudicated." 2
But if the court is to retrospectively enlarge and expand, by construc-
tion, a previous decision of "certiorari denied" to mean "decree affirmed,"
and that "decree affirmed" reaches all questions that might have been prop-
erly adjudicated, then, of course, the statute did impair the exercise of the
judicial power.
Supersedeas
Allowance of supersedeas in civil cases: When discretionary. In All
Florida Surety Company v .Coker,27 the court held that upon an appeal from
25. 151 Fla. 707, 10 So.2d 492 (1942).
26. Finston v. Finston, 37 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla. 1948); Ball v. Yates, 29 So.2d
729, 733 (Fla. 1946); Accord: McGregor v. Provident Trust Co. of Phila., 162 So.
323, 327 (Fla. 1935).
27. 79 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1955).
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a final judgment or decree, not wholly for the payment of money, the
granting or denial of supersedeas rested within the sound judicial discretion
of the trial court and the appellant was not entitled to supersede such a
final decree as a matter of right.28
Allowance of supersedeas in criminal cases: When discretionary. The
court, in Jones v. State,2 held that the granting vel non of a supersedeas
bond in a criminal case appealed was within the sound judicial discretion
which the trial judge must exercise upon a hearing of an application for
supersedeas, and that the Supreme Court would deny an application for
supersedeas pending the decision of the trial court.
Supersedeas bond: Attorneys' fees. In Larson v. Higginbotham,80 the
Supreme Court, upon motion to modify the conditions of an order grant-
ing supersedeas, held that it was improper to require a supersedeas bond
to be conditioned to pay attorneys' fees in resisting an appeal from a final
judgment or decree. This holding expressly overruled Kahn v. American
Surety Company of New York,81 Tonnelier v. Tonnelier<'2 and City of
Miami v. Huttoe.3
Improper conditions: Collateral attack. In Ritter v. Bently,34 the
trial judge, in fixing the terms of a supersedeas bond, specified that it
should be conditioned, inter alia, to pay attorneys' fees; supersedeas was
obtained by giving a bond in compliance thereto and the validity of the
order was not directly attacked by appeal, notice or petition, for certiorari.
The court held that the validity of the order could not be collaterally at-
tacked in a suit on the bond, and, liability attached according to its terms.
Review
Hypothetical points not considered. An appellate court will not
answer a mere question nor pass upon a hypothetical point raised thereby
which is not shown to be created by some judicial act assigned as error.
In this respect the Supreme Court held, in Lynn v. City of Fort Lauder-
dale:35
An appellant does not discharge this duty by merely posing a
question with an accompanying assertion that it was improperly
answered in the court below and then dumping the matter into
the lap of the appellate court for decision. Under such circum-
stances it must be held, as we now hold here, that we are under
no duty to answer the question.
28. See also FLA. SUP. CT. Rule 19.
29. 81 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1955).
30. 66 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1953).
31. 120 Fla. 50, 162 So. 335 (1935).
32, 133 Fla. 691, 182 So. 900 (1938).
33. 40 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1949).
34. 78 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1955).
35. 81 So.2d 511 (Fla. 1955 ).
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Record on appeal. In Bryant v. Kuhn, 8 it was held that an appellate
court, in review on appeal, was governed by the formal record and would
give no consideration to verbal rulings made by the trial judge which were
not shown by the record.
Scope of review of order granting new trial. Leonette v. Boone" held
that, upon an appeal from an order granting a new trial, the scope of the
review extended only to the grounds specified in the order.
Decision by Industrial Commission res judicata. After a final adverse
decision by the Industrial Commission in Workmen's Compensation,
which was not appealed to a court, a contrary decision was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the case of Gray v. Employers Mutual Liability In-
surance Company.88 A second petition was seasonably filed and the claim
was allowed by reason of a holding by the Supreme Court contrary to the
previous holding of the Commission. This latter holding of the Com-
mission was reversed upon the doctrine of res judicata by the previous or-
der of the Commission. 9
Admissability of evidence: Only grounds of objection stated will be
considered. An appellate court, in reviewing the admissability of evidence
at trial, would not consider any grounds of objection except those made at
trial.40
Statutory certiorari: Matter barred by 60 day limitation under Court
Rule pursuant to statute. Upon review by "certiorari," of an interlocutory
partial summary decree the court would not review an order entered more
than 60 days previous to the interlocutory partial summary decree.' 1
Dismissal of Appeal
On summary motion when appeal frivolous. A motion to dismiss an
appeal on the sole ground that the appeal was frivolous would be granted
only when the assignment of errors, tested by a superficial examination of
the record, lead to a reasonable conclusion that the appeal was clearly
without merit.' 2
Common Law Certiorari
Limitations of time. The court, in American Airmotive Corp. v.
Stutz,43 held that the statutory time limitation of 30 days within which to
seek review by a petition for a common law writ of certiorari as provided by
Section 440.27 of the Florida Statutes was superseded by Court Rule 28
36. 73 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1954).
37. 74 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1954).
38. 64 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1952).
39. Plymouth Citrus Products Co.op v. Williamson, 71 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1954).
40. Lineberger v. Domino Canning o. Falie, 68 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1953).
41. Lewis v. Lewis, 73 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1954),
42. Ex Parte Sams, 67 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1953).
43. 72 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1954).
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which allowed 60 days. It was emphasized that the court's rules limited
the time within which a petition for a common law writ of certiorari
might be presented, to 60 days, and not 30 days as provided by the Work-
men's Compensation Act.44
Scope of review on common certiorari to boards and commissions. In
Wilson v. McCoy Manufacturing Co.," the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
holding of J. T. and K. W. Ry. v. Antone Boy,40 that, upon common law
certiorari granted to review the decisions of boards exercising quasi judicial
power, the court would examine the record "not only to see whether such
officers or boards kept within their jurisdictional powers, but whether or
not they have acted strictly according to law, and errors and irregularities
committed by them will be corrected."
Mere administrative action not reviewable. The Supreme Court held
that it did not have jurisdiction, on certiorari, under the constitutional
provision authorizing the issuance of such writs, to review assessments of
taxes by the Railroad Assessment Board.47 The assessment was evidently
not considered to be an exercise of judicial power under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution; if it had been, the ruling might have been otherwise.
Order dissolving writ of garnishment. In Slatcoff v. Dezen,4 the Su-
preme Court held that an order that "The garnishee (be) discharged from
this cause" was a final judgment and not subject to review by a common
law writ of certiorari.
PART II
THE EFFECT ON BENCH AND BAR OF THE JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL
CHAN1CES OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE V
Introduction
The judicial Council presented for introduction in the 1955 Legislature
a proposed revision of Article V of the Constitution of Florida which was
introduced in the Senate as S.B. 571, and H.B. 810. The Council's draft
was amended by the elimination of both the Missouri Plan relating to the
election of judges and a provision requiring the Governor to fill vacancies
from a pool selected by a commission. The proposal for the Revision of
Article V will be numbered "No. 1" of the eleven proposed amendments to
be submitted for ratification or rejection by the electorate in November
1956.
44. FLA. STAT. § 450.29 (1953). See also FLA. SuP. CT. Rule 16.
45. See Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., 69 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
46. 34 F1a. 389, 16 So. 290 (1894).
47. Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Gay, 68 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1953).
48. 72 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1954).
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Supreme Court
Present Constitutional Provision. Article V, Section 5, of the present
constitution specifies the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
follows:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
of all cases at law or in equity originating in circuit courts, and of
appeals from Circuit Courts in cases arising before judges of the
County Courts in matter pertaining to their probate jurisdiction
and in the management of the estates of infants, and in cases of
conviction of felony in the criminal courts, and in all criminal cases
originating in the Circuit Courts. (emphasis supplied)4 9
Appeals to the Supreme Court: Now. The present constitution expressly
specifies the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, either according
to the character of the case or the court rendering judgment. The present
simple, unambiguous standards have contributed little to frustrate the ad-
ministration of justice as to what is appealable and as to what court an
appeal may be taken, and there is no problem of split appeals.
Appeals to Supreme Court: As proposed. The proposed amendment, by
Section 4(b), provides in reference to the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as follows:
-from trial courts
(b) Jurisdiction. Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly
to the supreme court, as a matter of right, only from judgments
imposing the death penalty, from final judgments or decrees
directly passing upon the validity of a state statute or a federal
statute or treaty, or construing a controlling provision of the
Florida or federal constitution, and from final judgments or decrees
in proceedings for the validation of bonds and certificates of in-
debtedness. (emphasis supplied)
-from Courts of Appeal
Appeals from district courts of appeal may be taken to the Supreme
Court, as a matter of right, only from decisions initially passing
the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or
initially construing a controlling provision of the Florida or
federal Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Proposed Standards. In other than capital cases and bond validations,
the proposed criteria for exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is neither the character of the case nor the class of the court render-
ing judgment; the criteria proposed is whether the judge of any court made
conclusions on the validity of a statute or made conclusions concerning
a governing provision of the constitution as hereinafter pointed out.
Appeals "from final judgments or decrees directly passing on validity" of
a Statute. The language does not specify that the appeal shall be based
upon the "validity" of a statute but specifies that the appeal "may be taken"
49. Section 5 of Article V.
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from a final judgment or decree "directly passing on the validity" of a
statute. The final judgment or decree may directly pass upon the validity
of a statute but such validity may not be the basis of the appeal. If a party
is satisfied with the decree as to the validity of the statute directly passed
upon by the decree, but is aggrieved by the decree on non-constitutional
grounds, then does he appeal to the Supreme Court or to the Court of
Appeals? If one party is aggrieved on non-constitutional grounds, and
another party is aggrieved on constitutional grounds as to the validity of
the statute passed upon, then are both appeals to the Supreme Court or
does one go the Supreme Court and another to the Court of Appeals-
both appealing from the same decree?
The pleading may raise an issue as to the validity of a statute, but
the final judgment or decree may appropriately be rendered adjudicating
the merits of the controversy without mentioning the statute. The court
may have impliedly passed on the validity of the statute, if it was neces-
sary to the decision; or else the trial judge may have considered the
validity of the statute not material, and given it no further consideration
or mention. Does the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court have
appellate jurisdiction? Again, the pleadings may make no reference to a
statute but the final judgment may pass on its validity; then to which court
does the appeal lie? The validity of the statute may have been directly
passed upon but be immaterial to the controversy on appeal. To which
court does the appeal lie?
Appeals from judgments or decrees construing a controlling provision of
the Florida or federal Constitution. As in "passing on the validity" of a
statute, the final decree may impliedly or expressly construe a controlling
provision of a constitution. If done impliedly, it may or may not have
been raised by the pleadings. If raised by the pleadings, the trial judge
may have considered it immaterial and given it no further consideration.
One party to the decree may be aggrieved because Of the implied con-
struction and another party aggrieved because of non-constitutional ques-
tions. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction or the Court of Appeals?
Will split appeals be required from the same final decree: one to the
Supreme Court and another to the Court of Appeals?
The provisions of Section 4 of the proposal, relative to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, are quite novel. Its appellate jurisdic-
tion is conferred only by implication. This is proposed by providing that
appeals from trial courts to the Supreme Court "may be taken as matter
of right" only from final judgments or decrees imposing the death penalty,
validating bonds, "directly passing on the validity" of a statute or "con-
struing a controlling provision" of the Constitution.
Supreme Court: Heretofore and henceforth. Heretofore, the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extended to the review of all final
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judgments or decrees of the Circuit Court, the Court of Record and of
felony cases originating in the eight Criminal Courts of Record.
It is proposed that the Supreme Court retain its former appellate
jurisdiction only in capital cases and bond validations, and such final
judgments or decrees of the Circuit Court, the eight Criminal Courts of
Record, or the Court of Record as may be within the specified constitu-
tional areas. It is also proposed that there be added to this jurisdiction
appeals from the 900 appeals in civil and criminal cases heretofore going
to the circuit courts and such appeals from final judgments and decrees
of all such courts as the Justice of the Peace, Small Claims, Courts of
Crime, Municipal Courts, etc., "directly passing on the validity of a
statute" or "construing a controlling provision of the constitution."
Certiorari Supreme Court. The proposal would permit the review in the
Supreme Court by certiorari of some interlocutory orders and decrees in
equity of the trial courts and of some decisions of the Courts of Appeal;
also, a review of the decisions of commissions by certiorari would be per-
mitted.
Relative to review by the Supreme Court the common law discretionary
writ of certiorari, section 4(b) of the proposed amendment, provides:
(b) . . . The Supreme Court may review by certiorari interlocu-
tory orders or decrees passing upon chancery matters which upon
a final decree would be directly appealable to the Supreme Court.
It would seem that the Supreme Court would be authorized by this
provision to grant the discretionary common law writ of certiorari in
equity cases for the review of interlocutory orders and decrees which would
be reviewable by the Supreme Court on appeal from final judgmnts and
decrees. This means that the Supreme Court may grant certiorari to review
interlocutory orders and decrees in equity when the interlocutory order or
decree "passes on the validity of a statute" or "construes a controlling
provision" of the Constitution.
Of course, the problems of whether the trial court has passed on the
validity of the statute, whether it "construed" a provision of the Constitu-
tion and whether the provision was "controlling" will be the basis for
controversy as to the jurisdiction, unrelated to the merits of the review.
If the appeal has been taken to the wrong court it will doubtless be
bounced to the court thought appropriate and may then be bounced back.
Courts of Appeals and Commissions, Certiorari. Instead of providing for
the Supreme Court to have general jurisdiction in certiorari as at present,
it is proposed by section 4(b) that its jurisdiction in certiorari be limited
as follows:
.. . The Supreme Court may review by certiorari any decision of
a district court of appeal that affects a class of constitutional or
state officers, or that passes upon a question certified by the district
court of appeal to be of great public interest, or that is in direct
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conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the
Supreme Court on the same point of law, and may issue writs of
certiorari to commissions established by law.
The scope of review of the actions of the thirty odd commissions is
without limitation, but not so as to the decisions of the Courts of Appeal.
By the foregoing provisions the power to review by certiorari extends to
decisions of the Courts of Appeal only as specified.
Great Public Interest. '[he Supreme Court is authorizcd to grant common
law certiorari in decisions involving questions of "great public interest."
The term "great public inaterest" doubtless means "great public im-
portance," and might better have been so worded. In this instance, re-
view is dependent upon the Court of Appeals certifying the question to
be one of "great public interest" or importance. \Vhethcr the certificate
must affirmatively show the question to be of great public importance, or
whether that court's mere statement to that effect would be sufficient, is
problematical.
Conflicting Decisions. Review by certiorari is also authorized when a de-
cision of a Court of Appeals is in conflict with the decision of another
Court of Appeals or a decision of the Supreme Court "on the same point
of law." The granting of the writ would be discretionary; doubtless, in
many instances, this ground would be the basis for a further rcview from
the Courts of Appeal.
Courts of Appeal
Appeals. The proposed Amendment, by Section 5(c), provides for the
appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal as follows:
(c) Jurisdiction. Appeals from trial courts in each appellate
district, and from final orders or decrees of county judge's courts
pertaining to probate matters or to estates and interests of minors
and incompetents, may be taken to the court of appeals of such
districts, as a matter of right, from all final judgments or decrees
except those from which appeals may be taken direct to supreme
court or to a circuit court. (emphasis supplied)
When, for the purposes of clarity and understanding, the clauses,
phrases and words of paragraph (c), Section 5, are appropriately trans-
posed, they are likely to be interpreted to read, in effect, as follows:
(c) Appeals as a matter of right may be taken to the court of appeals
of the district (1) from all final judgments and decrees of trial courts and
(2) from final orders and decrees of county judge's courts pertaining to
probate matters, or to estates and interest of minors and incompetents;
except those from which appeals may be taken directly to the Supreme
Court or to a Circuit Court.
Certiorari. For review by the common law writ of certiorari in the Courts
of Appeal, section 5(c) of the proposal provides:
prohibition, and quo warranto ...
A district court of appeal may issue writs mandamus, certiorari,
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The foregoing provision vests the Courts of Appeal with general
jurisdiction to grant certiorari as is now vested in the Supreme Court and
the Circuit Courts,
Interlocutory Review in Law and Equity. It is proposed by section 5(b)
that the Supreme Court may provide for review in the Courts of Appeal
of interlocutory orders and decrees in matters reviewable by the Courts of
Appeal by appeal, certiorari or motion as follows:
The Supreme Court... ma y provide for review by such courts
of interlocutory orders or decrees in matters reviewable by the
district Courts of Appeal.
The Courts of Appeal will have no jurisdiction when the final decree
of the trial court involves the constitutional questions specified in section
4(a) and the appeal involves such questions, and when the determination
of the constitutional questions is essential to the decision, since, in such
instances, only the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction.
In the event that the Supreme Court should exercise the power con-
ferred, and if none of the specified questions of which only the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction have been raised and adjudged in the trial courts,
doubtless, the Courts of Appeal would have jurisdiction to review in the
manner to be specified by the Supreme Court. But, if after the proceed-
ings in certiorari had been commenced, the trial court proceeded and,
before the determination of the certiorari proceedings, passed on the validity
of a statute or construed a controlling provision of a constitution, then,
would the Court of Appeals be ousted of jurisdiction? Will the Court of
Appeals have jurisdiction if the constitutional questions are raised and
adjudicated interlocutorily, when adjudication is not essential to the final
judgment-a decree in respect to the party aggrieved?
Provisions for review by appeal and by certiorari in the Supreme
Court are limited, and it appears that no interlocutory review by certiorari
by that court was intended to be permitted unless the specified constitu-
tional questions were raised and adjudged. However, whether interlocutory
orders and decrees in law or in equity will be reviewable in the Courts of
Appeal before final judgment or decree, the question of policy is to be
left to the discretion of the Supreme Court and not the legislature.
Unlimited time for appeal to Supreme Court or Courts of Appeal. To
begin with, the constitution is paramount. What the constitution grants,
neither the legislature nor the courts may abolish or impair. The pro-
posed amendment, instead of expressly providing for the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court provides that in the limited and specified
circumstances appeals to the Supreme Court "may be taken as a matter
of right," thereby conferring appellate jurisdiction only by implication.
The words of the present constitution are: "The Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction in all cases at law, etc." Regarding the juris-
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diction of the Circuit Courts, the present constitution provides "The Cir-
cuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity,
etc.; original jurisdiction in actions of forcible entry, etc.; they shall have
final appellate jurisdiction in, etc."5 0 by such terms, only jurisdictional
power is conferred, and the right of appeal and the time allowed for appeal
is left to the legislature.
To confer judicial power by implication as proposed carries no evil
consequences, but to confer, without limitation of time, the unqualified
right to appeal under the constitution forbodes much that is not whole-
some. When a constitution simply vests judicial power, then the legisla-
ture may limit the time within which appeals may be taken, as, in this
state, to 60 days in civil cases and 90 days in criminal cases. This is in
order that the parties may know when litigation is at an end.
The proposed amendment is addressed, not to jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, but to appeals "as a matter of right." For the legislature
to attempt to limit the time for appeal to twenty days or twenty years
would impair this proposed constitutional grant of appeal "as a matter
of right" from the final judgments and decrees made appealable to the
Supreme Court and to the Courts of Appeal, but not the Circuit Courts
in which latter instance the language of the present constitution has been
followed.
If the foregoing interpretation is correct it will require an appeal in
every case which is appealable to the Supreme Court or the Courts of
Appeal in order that the parties may know that the litigation is at an end,
Circuit Courts
Appeads. The appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts in probate
matters would be transferred to the Courts of Appeal. It is proposed that
most of the appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts be the same as at
present with the few exceptions hereafter noted.
The proposed amendments, by Section 6(c), provides for the appellate
jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts as follows:
They shall have final appellate jurisdiction in all civil and criminal
cases arising in the county court, or before county judges' courts,
of all misdemeanors tried in criminal courts of record, and of all
cases arising in municipal courts, small claims courts, and courts
of justices of the peace.
The foregoing provision makes no mention of appeals from the Civil
Courts of Record, Courts of Crime, Traffic Courts and other courts which
the legislature may establish. It appears that appeals of final judgments
in misdemeanor cases and in civil actions from these courts would be ap-
pealable to the Courts of Appeals and not to the Circuit Courts, unless
the legislature would have power to enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court.
50. Section 11, Article V.
